This paper addresses con ‡icts between two groups when trying to win a public prize and analyzes how these contests are a¤ected when groups are led by an organizer with the capacity to impose transfers to share the costs of individual e¤orts within the group. We …rst describe optimal levels of group e¤ortthose that organizers wish to attain -and compare with e¤orts when individuals act non-cooperatively.
Introduction
This paper addresses con ‡icts between two groups when trying to win a public prize and analyzes how these contests are a¤ected when groups are led by an organizer with the capacity to impose transfers to share the costs of individual e¤orts within the group. First we describe optimal levels of group e¤ort -those that organizers wish to attain -and compare with e¤orts when individuals act non-cooperatively. Second, we characterize cost sharing schemes that induce group optimal levels of e¤ort. And, third, we examine the game where organizers compete strategically in setting the cost-sharing scheme of their group.
Situations in which this problem is relevant abound. Consider the case of two law …rms that compete to win a case. Winning a case is a public prize because lawyers increase their popularity when their …rm wins cases. However, when individual e¤ort to win a case is costly, lawyers may exert less e¤ort than the one the law …rm as a collective would like them to exert, causing a free riding problem. In order to implement a required level of e¤ort, law …rms may set a pay system that promotes e¤ort. In particular, law …rms may o¤er contracts where lawyers that exert more e¤ort receive a higher wage. Other examples are …rms competing for a market share; they can design a pay system to implement optimal e¤ort by its employees.
An important assumption of our model is that the prize is indivisible. We consider two types of contests: centralized and decentralized contests. In centralized contests there is an organizer in each group that chooses the e¤ort of each individual. The goal of the organizer is to maximize the group payo¤s. In decentralized contests there are not organizers and every individual chooses her e¤ort non-cooperatively. If the e¤ort exerted by a group in a centralized contest is larger than the e¤ort exerted in a decentralized contest, the free riding problem arises. Otherwise, the group faces an overworking problem.
Our results are as follows.
First, we show that the larger group will always face the free rider problem while the smaller one only does so if its size is su¢ ciently close to the larger group. Otherwise, the smaller group overworks. The free rider problem arises for the usual reason, which is that individuals in a group do not internalize the collective bene…ts that winning a public prize yields to the group. The overworking problem arises because individuals of the smaller group take advantage of the free riding in the larger group, thus exerting more e¤ort than in the centralized setting.
Second, we examine situations where organizers cannot force their individuals to exert a given e¤ort, but can design mechanisms to implement the optimal group e¤ort. In particular, we assume that organizers monitor e¤ort and can impose transfers among individuals within a group that depend on e¤ort. We call this situation a decentralized contest with transfers. These transfers are not contingent on the outcome of the contest, may be positive or negative, and are balanced. We …nd that when e¤ort costs are linear, an equal sharing of the total cost in a group induces individual e¤orts that deliver the optimal level of group e¤ort. Note that an egalitarian cost-sharing scheme is meritocratic, since individuals that exert low e¤ort must contribute to paying the costs of those that exert high e¤ort. For general convex cost we supply the analytical characterization of the transfers that implement optimal levels of group e¤ort. 1 Third, we analyze a game in which organizers compete in the transfer they o¤er. Since in the previous set up set transfers so that they commit to the optimal level of e¤ort, in this game organizers choose transfers to maximize the group payo¤s. This allows us to compare the e¤ects of transfers that solve the free riding and overworking problems and transfers used to compete strategically in the contest. In the …rst stage, organizers set transfers strategically and in the second stage individuals exert e¤ort. For analytical tractability, we focus on linear transfers. We show that the larger group sets a transfer that shares the e¤ort costs in an egalitarian way, as is the case in the implementation setup. The smaller group does not set an egalitarian cost-sharing scheme; it sets instead a less meritocratic transfer. With this scheme, members are induced to lower levels of e¤ort, and the lower probability of winning is compensated by lower total cost. Thus, the smaller group set transfers di¤erently. The reason is that when organizers behave strategically, the larger group has a dominant strategy, sharing the e¤ort costs of the contest in an egalitarian way, while the smaller group best responds to this dominant strategy.
Finally, we relate the problems of cost sharing and prize sharing in group contest. The main model of prize sharing in group contest consists of the following two stage contest. In the …rst stage, there is an organizer in each of the two groups that decides how to share a divisible prize among their individuals in case of winning. In the second stage, the contest takes place. First, we show that it is possible to rewrite the prize sharing setting as a problem of deciding a transfer among individuals within a group contingent on winning the contest. It di¤ers from the problem of cost sharing since in the latter transfers are set independently of the contest outcome. Then, the cost sharing problem is understood as a problem in which organizers set wages to their individuals while the prize sharing problem consists of winning premiums. Additionally, both problems di¤er since prize sharing can only be applied to the case in which the prize is divisible, while cost sharing applies both for divisible and indivisible prizes.
Literature review
This paper is related to the literature on group contests for a public prize. Katz, Nitzan and Rosemberg (1990) study a contest among two groups competing for a public prize, where individuals in the contest are homogeneous and costs are linear. They …nd that the group size does not matter, since both groups exert the same e¤ort. Consequently, in (symmetric) equilibrium individuals in the smaller group exert more e¤ort than individuals in the larger group. Esteban and Ray (2001) generalize the model assuming groups compete for a prize with public and private characteristics and convex costs. Their main concern is analyzing when the group size paradox (that smaller groups perform better than larger ones) is violated. They …nd that the group size paradox is violated the more convex costs are and the more public the prize is. Kolmar and Rommeswinkel (2013) also generalize Katz et. al. (1990) addressing heterogeneous individuals and e¤ort complementarities. They …nd that the degree of complementarity does not a¤ect the e¤ort exerted by the group when individuals in each group are homogeneous. When individuals are heterogeneous, the higher the heterogeneity the more similar the e¤ort they exert will be, even though they are less likely to win the contest. This occurs because individuals with a larger valuation are deterred to exert a large e¤ort due to the complementarities with the e¤ort exerted by individuals with a lower valuation. Kolmar and Rommeswinkel (2013) also generalize Baik (2008) and Lee (2012) . See Checkbossian (2008) and Nitzan and Ueda (2009,2013) for other papers of group contests for a public prize.
All these papers study group contest for a public prize. Their major concern is the performance of each group in the contest as a function of the size of the groups and the free riding problem within groups. Our contribution is to analyze the free riding problem as the di¤erence between the e¤ort exerted by the group in a centralized and decentralized contest and to show how this problem can be solved by transfers among individuals.
Our research is also related to prize sharing in group contests. Nitzan (1991) assumes a prize sharing rule based on a convex combination of an egalitarian distribution and a distribution depending on the relative e¤ort exerted by each individual with respect to the whole group. Lee (1995) generalizes Nitzan (1991) through the following two stage contest. In the …rst stage, an organizer in each group determines the sharing rule proposed by Nitzan (1991) , while in the second stage the contest takes place, the rule being publicly known. Gürtler (2005) extends Lee (1995) analyzing the case in which groups determine their sharing rules simultaneously or sequentially. Baik and Lee (2012) study whether a group reveals the sharing rule. Nitzan and Ueda (2011) examine a general model in which the sharing rule is private information.
All these papers study the e¤ects of sharing a private and divisible prize in the contest. By de…nition, a public prize is non rival and non exclusive. Therefore, if a prize is public, it is non divisible. However, indivisible prizes may become somehow divisible by cost sharing. 2 We also relate the problem of cost sharing and prize sharing, generalizing the latter using transfers among individuals contingent on winning the contest. An important di¤erence between prize sharing and cost sharing is that while the former only allows for transfers among individuals within a group contingent on winning the contest, the latter is not contingent on the outcome. The paper has the following structure. In the next section, the main framework is introduced. Section 2 Some papers introduce the term of cooperation by splitting the e¤ort costs of the contest in an egalitarian way in order to solve other problems. However, as far as we know, there is no research about deciding how to share the e¤ort costs of the contest. Ursprung (2012) is the paper that makes the closest approach, comparing the situations of incentives (as in prize sharing), cooperation and non incentives nor cooperation for a private prize. He …nds that cooperation is preferred to incentives, though it is not maintainable in the long run. For other papers see Epstein and Mealem (2012) .
3 analyzes centralized and decentralized contest and the free rider and overworking problem that arises in the latter. Section 4 shows how organizers solve the free riding problem and overworking problem through transfers. Section 5 analyzes the case in which organizers set transfers strategically. Section 6 relates the problems of cost sharing and prize sharing. Section 7 concludes. Proofs are relegated to the appendix.
The model
Consider a contest between two groups l = 1; 2 that compete in order to win a public prize. Each group is composed of n l individuals and without loss of generality, n 1 n 2 . In particular, let n 1 = an 2 , with a 2 [1; 1). All individuals value the public prize v. Individuals of each group exert e¤ort in order to win the prize. E¤ort exerted by individual i in group l is denoted by e li and the total e¤ort exerted for the group
e li and so on. The total e¤ort exerted in the contest is
The probability that group l wins the prize is p l (E l ; E m ) for all l = 1; 2, which is increasing in E l , decreasing in E m for m 6 = l and satis…es homogeneity of degree 0. 3 The probability that group m 6 = l wins
E¤ort is costly and the cost function is convex:
with 0. Thus, the payo¤ function of individual i in group l is given by:
while the group payo¤ function is:
Note that individuals in both groups value equally the public prize and have the same cost function.
Groups only di¤er in size and its analysis is our main purpose. We distinguish between two types of contests:
centralized and decentralized contests.
In a centralized contest, there is an organizer in each group that chooses the e¤ort of each individual.
The goal of the organizer is to maximize the group payo¤s.
In a decentralized contest, there are no organizers and every individual chooses e¤ort non-cooperatively.
Section 3 analyzes the free riding problem that arises in decentralized contests taking the centralized contest as a benchmark.
In Section 4, we analyze decentralized contests with transfers. We will there assume organizers do not control the e¤ort of their individuals, but can set transfers t l (e li ; E l ) among individuals in the same group to provide incentives. These transfers depend on e¤ort, are not contingent on the outcome of the contest, may be positive or negative, and are balanced:
For the purposes of simplicity, we will focus on transfers which are continuous and di¤erentiable in both arguments. The problem facing the organizers is to choose the transfers that implement the e¤ort exerted in a centralized contest.
In Section 5, organizers set transfers strategically. We study the following two stage game. In the …rst stage, organizers choose non-cooperatively and simultaneously the transfer t l (e li ; E l ) to maximize the group payo¤s. In the second stage, individuals exert e¤ort. There is perfect information and the problem is solved by backward induction.
Free riding and overworking in decentralized contests
This section analyzes conditions for the free riding and overworking problems. To do so, we de…ne and analyze two di¤erent types of contests, centralized and decentralized contest.
A contest is centralized if there is an organizer in each group that chooses the amount of e¤ort that individuals in her group are going to exert. We assume that organizers can force their individuals to exert such e¤ort. The goal of each organizer is to maximize the payo¤s of her group. Therefore, organizers internalize the bene…ts that winning a prize yields to every individual in the group.
A contest is decentralized if there are no organizers in groups. In a decentralized contest, every individual in every group chooses the amount of e¤ort that maximizes their own payo¤s and they do not take into account the payo¤s of the rest of the group. That is, individuals do not internalize the bene…ts that winning a prize yields to every individual in the group when exerting e¤ort.
Let E c l and E d l be the e¤ort exerted by group l = 1; 2 in a centralized and a decentralized contest respectively.
De…nition 1
The free rider problem arises in group l = 1; 2 if E c l > E d l . The overworking problem arises in group l = 1; 2 if E c l < E d l .
We will see next that free riding in one group may induce overworking in the other group.
We start by analyzing a centralized contest. In a centralized contest, the payo¤ function of organizers is given by equation (3). The following …rst order condition is necessary: @p l (E l ; E m ) @E l vn l = e li , i = 1:::n l ; l = 1; 2.
Note that since the left hand side is equal for every individual in the same group and the right hand side is endogenous, every individual in each group will exert the same amount of e¤ort in equilibrium when > 0, so that e li = e lj = e l for every i 6 = j. 4 Now, using the …rst order conditions of a representative individual for each group and since p l (E l ; E m ) is homogeneous of degree 0, it follows that e l = e m = e for m 6 = l. When introducing these conditions in equation (5) , it follows that the e¤ort exerted by any individual evaluated at the equilibrium is
and the total e¤ort of the group evaluated at the equilibrium is:
It is straightforward to see that since every individual in a centralized contest exerts the same amount of e¤ort, the larger group will exert more e¤ort and is therefore more likely to win the contest than the smaller group.
In a decentralized contest, there are no organizers and every individual chooses the amount of e¤ort that maximizes her own payo¤s, which are given by equation (2) . The following set of …rst order conditions is necessary:
@p l (E l ; E m ) @E l v = e li , i = 1:::n l ; l = 1; 2.
Again, when > 0 individuals within the same group exert the same amount of e¤ort so that e li = e lj = e l for every i 6 = j. Using the …rst order conditions and since p l (E l ; E m ) is homogeneous of degree 0, it follows that:
Then, the e¤ort exerted by individuals will depend on the size of both groups. Moreover, individuals in the larger group will exert less e¤ort than individuals in the smaller group. However, also using homogeneity of 4 In case = 0, the marginal cost becomes unity. Then, there is a continuum of equilibria of e¤ort exerted by individuals within the group. For the remaining of the paper, in case = 0, we will refer to the symmetric equilibrium within the group, in which every individual exerts the same amount of e¤ort. degree 0 it is easy to see that the larger group will exert more e¤ort than the smaller group, being more likely to win the contest when > 0. Otherwise, both groups exert the same amount of e¤ort. Using equation (9) and (8) yields individual e¤ort in each group:
and group e¤ort is:
The following proposition states conditions for the free rider and overworking problems.
Proposition 1
The larger group will always face the free riding problem, while the smaller one does only if its size is su¢ ciently close to the larger group, and otherwise overworks. That is, there exists an a 2 [1; 1)
such that for a < a, both groups free ride while for a > a, Group 2 overworks. 5
Both problems arise because in a decentralized contest individuals do not internalize the bene…ts that winning a public prize yields to the group, while organizers do in a centralized setting. In case a < a, both organizers force their individuals to make more e¤ort than the one exerted in a decentralized contest since they take into account the bene…ts that every individual in the group obtains in case of winning the prize. Now analyze the case in which a > a. In a centralized contest, the organizer in Group 2 knows that the e¤ort that organizer in Group 1 will choose will be high since her membership is larger. Then, the organizer in Group 2 chooses a small amount of e¤ort, since lower costs compensate the smaller probability of winning of her group. However, in a decentralized contest, individuals in Group 2 take advantage of the lower amount of e¤ort exerted in Group 1 due to the lack of internalization of the properties of the public prize and exert more e¤ort than in the centralized e¤ort, yielding the overworking problem.
Implementation of centralized e¤ort
In the previous section, we assumed that individuals follow the instructions of their organizer obediently. In this section, we assume that organizers cannot force their individuals to exert an amount of e¤ort, but can design mechanisms in order to implement the e¤ort exerted in a centralized contest. In particular, we assume that organizers can set transfers among individuals within a group. We call this situation a decentralized contest with transfers.
In a decentralized contest with transfers, individuals in each group may receive (pay) a transfer t l (e li ; E l ) from (to) other individuals in the same group. These transfers are balanced and are not contingent on the outcome of the contest. For simplicity, we will focus on transfers that are continuous and di¤erentiable in both arguments. The payo¤ function of individual i in group l becomes:
By condition (4), it follows that the group payo¤ function is the same that in equation (3).
Transfers redistribute the cost of the contest among individuals in a group. Organizers can compensate individuals that exert more e¤ort in the contest and penalize those who exert less.
Throughout the paper, we will refer to meritocracy of transfers set by each organizers, de…ned as follows:
For any given vector of e¤ orts (e l1 ; :::; e ln ), transfer t 1 (e li ; E l i ) is more meritocratic than transfer t 2 (e li ; E l i ) at (e l1 ; ::
The problem facing each organizer is to set a transfer t l (e li ; E l ) that implements the e¤ort exerted in a centralized contest under the assumption that the organizer in the other group does likewise. 6 We start by analyzing the problem for linear costs since it is intuitive and tractable.
Proposition 2 Assume = 0. The transfer function that implements the e¤ ort exerted in a centralized contest is: t t l (e li ; E l i ) = e li E l n l for i = 1:::n l ; l = 1; 2:
This transfer function is meritocratic. The organizer in Group 1 sets a more meritocratic function than the organizer in Group 2.
The upper-script t denotes a decentralized contest with transfers scenario. The proof consists of introducing (13) in (12) and checking that the transfer implements the e¤ort of the centralized contest. 7 The transfer that every individual in a group obtains is the di¤erence among her e¤ort and the average of the e¤ort in the group. 8 This transfer is meritocratic and therefore induces individuals to exert more e¤ort than they would without the transfers. Furthermore, the larger group sets a more meritocratic transfer than the smaller one, since the marginal cost of individuals decreases in the size of the group.
Note that although transfers are meritocratic and induce individuals in both groups to exert more e¤ort, these transfers solve the overworking problem that may arise in the small group. The main reason is that by setting these transfers, the larger group is induced to exert a large amount of e¤ort. In absence of transfers, the smaller group would exert much less e¤ort than in a centralized contest, since they are desincentivized by the agressivity of the larger group. Therefore, in order to implement the e¤ort of the centralized contest the smaller group also needs meritocratic transfers.
Inserting the transfer function with linear costs in payo¤ function (12) , it follows that:
Therefore, the cost of any individual depends on the average of the e¤ort exerted by her group. By setting these transfers, organizers have introduced an egalitarian rule in the distribution of the costs of the contest.
That is, every individual in the group will pay exactly the same costs independently on the amount of e¤ort made by the rest of the individuals in the group. The intuition is simple. In case one individual exerts more e¤ort than another one in the group, the individual that exerts less e¤ort obtains higher payo¤s since every individual in the group bene…ts equally from a public prize. However, by setting this transfer, the individuals that exert less e¤ort during the contest will be forced to send a transfer to the hard-workers so that every individual obtains the same payo¤s.
It is easy to see that with this transfer, the marginal cost of every individual is being substituted with the group marginal cost, solving the free riding or overworking problems.
The transfer presented in Proposition 2 implements the e¤ort exerted in the centralized contest in case of linear costs and individuals within a group value the prize equally. However, other transfers are needed when costs are convex. 9 Since the problem becomes more complicated in this case, we will use a speci…c functional form for the Contest Success Function (CSF). In particular, we will use the Tullock Contest Success Function: 10 11 
We now generalize the problem of implementation of centralized e¤ort when costs are convex and the Contest Success Function has a Tullock form. So far, we have analyzed the centralized contest for a general 9 Other transfers are also needed when individuals value the prize di¤erently. This case is analyzed in Appendix C for linear costs. 1 0 Skaperdas (1996) axiomatized the Tullock Contest Success Function. For the purposes of simplicity, we assume that e¤orts enter additively in the Contest Success Function. See Kohlmar and Rommeswinkel (2013) for a generalization with a CES as impact functions. 1 1 From here onwards, we will use this function for the rest of the exposition.
Contest Success Function. Introducing (15) in (7) we obtain the e¤ort exerted in a centralized contest for the Tullock CSF :
We now solve the problem of the decentralized contest with transfers. To do so, introduce the Tullock CSF given by (15) in the individual payo¤ function (12) . Then, take the …rst order condition for every individual in each group yields:
Denote f (e li ; E l i ) e li @t l (e li ; E l i )=@e li . Using (18) for any individual of both groups, we obtain the e¤ort exerted in the group evaluated in the equilibrium in a decentralized contest with transfers:
The organizer of each group implements the e¤ort of the centralized contest choosing the transfer
is a Tullock CSF. The transfer function that implements the e¤ ort of a centralized contest is:
e lk n l 1 e li ), for l = 1; 2; i = 1:::n l :
where
This transfer function is meritocratic for e li > A 1 l . The organizer in Group 1 sets a more meritocratic transfer function than the organizer in Group 2.
The proof consists of introducing (15) and (20) in (12) and checking that the transfer implements the e¤ort of the centralized contest. In the appendix, we show how to construct the transfer function. Even though the functional form is complex, it can be decomposed in 2 parts. First of all, the transfer that an individual obtains depends positively on the distance among her cost of e¤ort and the average cost of the rest of individuals in the group. Additionally, it depends negatively on the distance between her cost of e¤ort and the average e¤ort of the rest of individuals in the group, since A l is positive. Therefore, A l can be understood as a desincentivizing parameter. Parameter A l is decreasing in n l since organizers want their individuals to make more e¤ort the larger is the group. It is increasing in n m , since the rival group becomes stronger and desincentivize the organizer of the group.
Note also that the transfer function is meritocratic for e li > A 1= l . The reason is that with convex costs, the organizer of the smaller group sets a non meritocratic transfer function to avoid overworking.
Finally, note that contrarily to the case of linear costs, it is now necessary to assume that the leader of each group knows both the value of the prize and the size of the rival group.
Strategic transfer setting by organizers
In this section, organizers choose the transfer functions strategically in order to maximize the group payo¤s.
For analytical tractability, we assume organizers are constrained to use linear transfer functions as follows:
We also assume that = 0. Linearity in costs allows the possibility of obtaining closed form solutions for e¤orts and the parameters of the transfer functions in this setting.
In the …rst stage, each organizer chooses the parameters a l and b l simultaneously and non-cooperatively with the other group in order to maximize the group payo¤s. In the second stage, individuals in each group exert e¤ort and the contest takes place.
Before solving the game, it is interesting to understand some properties of the linear transfer function.
First of all, using equation (4) on the linear transfer function it follows that b l = a l =n l . Likewise, call l = (1 a l ), and assume l 2 [0; 1] for l = 1; 2. Introducing these equalities in equation (22), and introducing the resulting transfer function in the payo¤ function (12) yields:
E l n l for i = 1:::n l ; l = 1; 2:
Therefore, the payo¤ function of individuals in the contest is given by the expected value of winning the prize minus a convex combination among 2 rules of sharing the costs of the contest, where l is the parameter of the convex combination. In case l = 1, each individual in a group faces her individual cost, while in case l = 0 each individual assumes the average e¤ort cost of the group. Mixed rules are allowed, since l 2 [0; 1] for l = 1; 2.
It is necessary to …nd the values of l that each organizer chooses in order to solve the game. We proceed using backward induction. Then, we start solving the second stage of the game. In the second stage, every individual in the contest chooses the e¤ort that maximizes equation (23) taking parameters l for l = 1; 2 as given.
The following …rst order condition for any individual in group l = 1; 2 is necessary:
where l = l (n l 1)=n l + 1=n l . The marginal cost depends on the sharing rule chosen by the organizer of the group. The lower l is, the lower the marginal cost of each individual of group l for l = 1; 2 is (and viceversa). Note also that for a given l > 0, the higher the size of group l, the lower the marginal cost of individuals is since part (or all) of the cost is assumed to be shared among all the individuals in the group.
Using the …rst order conditions of any 2 individuals of di¤erent groups yields:
Equation (25) relates the e¤ort exerted by group m relative to group l, which depends on parameter . This parameter depends on l for l = 1; 2 and the size of both groups. Other things equal, the group whose is lower will be the group that exerts more e¤ort; and again other things equal, the group whose size is larger will exert more e¤ort than the other group for l > 0.
Introducing equation (25) in (24) yields the e¤ort exerted by each group as a function of l and m :
And introducing (25) in (15) yields the winning probability of each group as a function of l and m :
Note that the equilibrium has not yet been characterized. The problem has been solved as a function of the decision rules that need to be set in the …rst stage of the game. Solving backwards, organizers set in a non-cooperative way the rules l such that they maximize their group payo¤s. Introducing equations (27) and (26) in equation (23), and summing across individuals, we obtain the group payo¤s as a function of l and m :
Taking the …rst derivative of function (28) with respect to l and making some algebraical arrangements:
] for l = 1; 2; l 6 = m:
Studying the properties of the group payo¤ function allows us to determine the decision rule set by each group and consequently characterize the equilibrium in the …rst and second stages. The following proposition shows the main results.
Proposition 4 Suppose = 0, p l (E l ; E m ) is a Tullock CSF and organizers set transfers strategically.
a) If n 1 = n 2 , then l = 0 and t l (e li ; E l i ) = e li E l n l for l = 1; 2: (30)
Therefore, both groups in the contest exert the same amount of e¤ ort and are equally likely to win.
b) If n 1 > n 2 , then l = 0, 2 = (n 1 n 2 )=((n 2 1)n 1 ). Then, organizer of Group 1 chooses the transfer function of equation (30), while organizer of Group 2 chooses: t 2 (e 2i ; E 2 i ) = n 1 n 2 2n 1 + n 2 n 1 (n 2 1) e 2i n 1 n 2 2n 1 + n 2 n 1 (n 2 1)
Therefore, Group 1 exerts more e¤ ort than Group 2 and is more likely to win the contest.
The upper-script denotes the strategic transfer setting by organizers scenario. If groups have the same size, organizers split the e¤ort costs of the group among individuals in an egalitarian way. This decision is a dominant strategy for both organizers. By setting this rule, individuals have a lower marginal cost, which induces them to exert more e¤ort to be more likely to win the contest. Since groups are equal in size and have chosen the same rule, both groups will exert the same e¤ort in equilibrium and are equally likely to win. Furthermore, the transfers chosen by organizers when they behave strategically coincide with the implementation case when groups have the same size.
E¤ort is higher than in case the rule is l = 1 (i.e. when there are no transfers) for both groups because, since the marginal cost of every individual in each group is lower due to the cost sharing rule, the best responses of each group shifts outwards as can be seen in the following example. Since l = 0 induces the same transfer than in Proposition 2 when costs are linear, the best responses and the equilibrium when organizers set transfers strategically coincides with the case of decentralized contest with transfers.
Example 1
Let v = 1 and n l = 5 for l = 1; 2. Figure 1 plots the best responses of both groups for di¤ erent values of l . In case both groups set the rule l = 1, the best response function of Group 1 is drawn with a solid line, while the best response function of Group 2 is drawn with a dashed line. In case both groups set the rule l = 0 the best response function of group 1 is drawed with a thick solid line, while the best response function of Group 2 is drawn with a thick dashed line. The thick solid and dashed lines coincides with the best responses in case organizers set the transfer that implements the centralized e¤ ort with linear costs. Both best responses are outwards in the latter cases, and both groups are induced to exert more e¤ ort. In case groups di¤er in size, the organizer in the larger group splits the total costs among her individuals while the organizer in the smaller one sets a mixed rule. Furthermore, the higher the di¤erence of size among groups, the less egalitarian the rule set by the smaller group is because the larger group has the dominant strategy of setting the egalitarian rule. The egalitarian rule for the larger group is more meritocratic than the egalitarian rule for the smaller one, since the marginal cost depends on the size of the group. Then, the smaller group sets a less meritocratic rule since the higher probability of winning than a more meritocratic rule yields does not compensate the cost of e¤ort. Therefore, the transfer chosen by the organizer of the larger group coincides with the implementation case, while the transfer set by the organizer of the smaller group di¤ers. It yields that the larger group will exert more e¤ort than the smaller one, as it is more likely to win the contest. In particular, for the larger (smaller) group, the e¤ort of the smaller (larger) group is a strategic complement (substitute), as can be seen in the following example. 12 Example 2 Let v = 1 for l = 1; 2, n 1 = 4 and n 2 = 3. In the equilibrium in which organizers set transfers strategically, Group 1 will set the rule 1 = 0 while Group 2 will set 2 = 0:125. Figure 2 plots the best response of both groups when organizers set transfers strategically and when organizers set the transfer that implements the centralized e¤ ort with linear costs. The best response function of Group 1 for both cases is drawn with a solid line. The best response function of Group 2 is drawn with a dashed line when organizers set transfers strategically and with a thick dashed line in the other case. While the transfers chosen by organizers when they behave strategically coincide with the implementation case when groups have the same size, they di¤er in case the size is di¤erent. The main reason is that when organizers set transfers strategically, the organizer in Group 1 has a dominant strategy of setting the transfer function given in (30) while the organizer in Group 2 maximizes its payo¤s subject to this dominant strategy.
Then, the contest becomes sequential. However, in case organizers choose the transfer that implements the centralized e¤ort, they are choosing a transfer restricting to a given e¤ort which is the result of a simultaneous contest. 13 A natural question is whether organizers prefer a centralized contest or to set transfers strategically. The answer to this question is that both groups would be better o¤ in the case of organizers behaving strategically.
The main reason is that the smaller group sets a less meritocratic transfer function since the lower probability of winning the contest is compensated by a lower cost by the e¤ort exerted by her individuals. Furthermore, since the smaller group is weaker, the larger group will exert less e¤ort in equilibrium, as can be seen in Figure 2 . Therefore, both groups would obtain higher payo¤s in case of setting transfers strategically.
Relation to the problem of prize sharing
It is interesting to relate the framework presented in this paper with the model used in the literature of prize sharing in group contests. The problem of prize sharing consists of determining how a divisible prize is shared among the individuals of the winning group.
Indeed, it is possible to derive the prize sharing framework using transfers among individuals. To do so, assume that groups compete for a divisible prize which is shared among the individuals in the winning group in per capita terms. Second, assume each organizer decides to transfer among her individuals just in case the group wins the contest. These transfers depend on the e¤ort exerted by every individual and the e¤ort exerted by the rest of the individuals in the group. Then, the problem of every individual in every group can be written as:
li + 1 , i = 1:::n l ; l = 1; 2.
(32)
Suppose the transfer function takes the following form:
It is easy to see that transfers are balanced. Introducing this transfer in (32) it follows that:
which is the main framework analyzed in the literature of prize sharing in group contests.
The main di¤erence among the problem presented in this paper, which corresponds to cost sharing, and the problem of prize sharing is the nature of transfers. In this paper, transfers are set independently on the result of the contest, while in the framework of prize sharing transfers are contingent on winning the contest.
The interpretation is the following. When transfers are set independently on winning the contest or not, what is being set is a contract for every individual. However, when transfers are set contingent on the result of the contest, what is being decided is a premium for each individual.
In order to illustrate the problem recall again the case of law …rms. Law …rms will pay the more hardworking lawyers a higher wage, regardless of whether the case is won or not. In addition to this, in case of winning the case, lawyers in the winning law …rm will obtain a premium which may likewise depend on the e¤ort exerted by each lawyer relative to the total e¤ort exerted in the …rm, if this is the chosen rule.
It is likewise interesting to relate the results obtained up to now with the results found by Lee (1995) 14 .
He uses the framework described in equation (34) under the assumption of linear costs and the Tullock CSF for p l (E l ; E m ). In the …rst stage, each organizer chooses the sharing rule l . In the second stage the contest takes place. He …nds that when groups have the same size, organizers decide to share the prize depending exclusively on the relative e¤ort, so that l = 1 for l = 1; 2. This result is in line with the results obtained in this paper, since groups set a rule that induces individuals to exert more e¤ort in equilibrium. However, in the case of the groups di¤ering in size, he …nds that the organizer in the smaller group chooses a rule based on the relative e¤ort (which induces to make more e¤ort) while the organizer in the larger group chooses a mixed rule, such that both groups exert the same amount of e¤ort in equilibrium. The results obtained in this paper are di¤erent because the e¤ort costs of the group can be shared independently of the outcome of the contest while in the paper of Lee (1995) transfers are only set in the case of winning the contest.
Conclusions
This paper analyzes a contest between two groups to win a public prize and studies how these contests are a¤ected when groups are led by an organizer with the capacity to impose transfers to share the costs of individual e¤orts within the group. We describe optimal levels of group e¤ort as those that organizers wish to attain (centralized contest) and compare them with e¤orts when individuals act non-cooperatively (decentralized contest). If the e¤ort exerted by a group in a centralized contest is larger than the e¤ort exerted in a decentralized contest, the free riding problem arises. Otherwise, the group faces an overworking problem. We have shown that the larger group will always face the free riding problem while the smaller one only does so if its size is su¢ ciently close to the larger group. Otherwise, the smaller group overworks. While we present a new approach in the literature de…ning the free riding and overworking problems in contests, the results also allows us to understand the nature of the transfers that organizers set to solve them.
We also show that in the simple case in which individual valuation of the public prize are homogeneous and e¤ort costs are linear, an equal sharing of the total cost in a group induces individual e¤orts that deliver the optimal level of group e¤ort. We also provide the analytical characterization of the transfers that implement optimal levels of group e¤ort for general convex cost.
One may argue that a severe punishment set by organizers to their individuals in case of deviating from the centralized e¤ort would also solve the free riding and overworking problem. We have only focused on continuous transfers for simplicity. Furthermore, such severe punishments would not be credible by individuals since the purpose of the organizer is to maximize group payo¤s.
We also examine the game where organizers compete strategically in setting the cost-sharing scheme of their group. We show that the transfers that …x the free riding and overworking problems are not an equilibrium when groups di¤er in size. In particular, we …nd that the smaller group sets a less meritocratic transfer than the one set in the implementation case.
Recalling the examples in the introduction, these results suggest that …rms would set contracts that bene…t hard-working individuals in deterrence to those who work less. Furthermore, these contracts would be more meritocratic for any …rm independently of their size in case their goals are solving the free riding and overworking problem than in case contracts are set strategically. This is because smaller …rms would prefer to set less meritocratic contracts to deter e¤ort in the large …rm, so that the lower expected pro…ts are compensated by lower costs.
When organizers set transfers strategically, the model becomes complicated if costs are convex. Intuition suggests that cost convexity will induce organizers to set meritocratic transfers to avoid the e¤ects of higher marginal costs and induce individuals to exert more e¤ort.
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and n 1 = an 2 with a 2 [1; 1). First of all, we show that Group 1 always su¤ers from free riding. Note that E c 1 > E d 1 if and only if n 1 @p 1 (1; 1 a )=@E 1 > @p 1 (1; a +1 )=@E 1 .Let h 1 (a) = 1 1 an 2 @p1(1;a +1 ) @E1 @p1(1; 1 a ) @E1
.
(35)
Note that h 1 (a) is increasing for all a 2 [1; 1) if the following condition is satis…ed: 15 1 a @p 1 (1; a +1 ) @E 1
See …rst that h 1 (a) is positive for all a 2 [1; 1) , which implies that the larger group always su¤ers from the free rider problem. Take the limit of h 1 (a) when a ! 1. It follows that h 1 (a) tends to 1 1=n 2 , which is positive. Now, take the limit when a ! 1. It follows that h 1 (a) tends to 1, which is positive. Since h 1 (a) is increasing for all a 2 [1; 1) if (36) holds, it follows that h 1 (a) is positive for all a 2 [1; 1), which implies that the larger group always su¤ers from the free rider problem.
We now show that for all a 2 [1; 1), there exists an a such that for a < a, the smaller group su¤ers from the free rider problem, while for a > a, the smaller group overworks. To do so, notice that E c 2 > E d 2 if and only if n 1 @p 1 (1; 1 a )=@E 1 > a@p 1 (1; a +1 )=@E 1 . Let h 2 (a) = 1 a n 1 @p1(1;a +1 ) @E1 @p1(1; 1 a ) @E1
(37)
Note that h 2 (a) is decreasing for all a 2 [1; 1) if the following condition is satis…ed: 16 1 a @p 1 (1; a +1 ) @E 1
See …rst that for all a 2 [1; 1) , there exists an a such that h 2 ( a) = 0. Take the limit of h 2 (a) when a ! 1.
It follows that h 2 (a) tends to 1 1=n 1 , which is positive. Now, take the limit when a ! 1. It follows that h 2 (a) tends to 1. Since h 2 (a) is decreasing for all a 2 [1; 1) , by the intermediate value theorem, there
exists an a such that h 2 ( a) = 0. Thus, for all a < a, h 2 (a) is positive which implies that Group 2 su¤ers from the free rider problem, while for a > a, h 2 (a) is negative which implies that Group 2 overworks.
Proof of Proposition 2. For the …rst part, insert equation (13) in (12) . The …rst order condition for every group coincides with (5) .
For the second part, just note that @t l (e li ; E l i )=@e l = 1 1=n l > 0. Now suppose that n 1 > n 2 . It follows that 1 1=n 1 > 1 1=n 2 , which implies that @t 1 (e 1i ; E 1 i )=@e 1i > @t 2 (e 2i ; E 2 i )=@e 2i .
Proof of Proposition 3. For the …rst part, equate (17) and (19) for both groups and solve the system of equations with unknowkns f (e t li ; E t l i ) for l = 1; 2.
We obtaine that f (e li ; E l i ) = e li @t l (e li ; E l i ) @e li = A l , l = 1; 2,
where A l = vn m (n l + n m ) 2 ( V n l n m (n l + n m ) 2 ) 1 +1 .
(40)
Isolate and integrate @t l (z li ; E l i )=@z li with respect to z li in the interval [0; e li ]. It follows that the transfer function of individual i in group l is given by:
Since P n l i=1 t l (e li ; E l i ) = 0, it follows that:
In order to …nd the function Q(E l i ), it is necessary to solve this functional equation. To do so, consider the vector of e¤orts in which every individual in the group exert 0 e¤ort. It follows that Q(0) = 0. Now, consider all the possible vectors of e¤orts in which all the components are 0 except for 1 individual, namely j. If follows that:
A l E l 12:::(j 1)(j+1):::n l e 1+ lj 1 + = (n l 1)Q(e lj ) + Q(0); j = 1:::n l .
which can be rewritten as: Introducing equation (44) for j and k and rearranging it is obtained that:
Repeating this process, it is obtained that
and introducing it in equation (41) the optimal transfer function arises.
The transfer is meritocratic if @t l (e li ; E l i )=@e li > 0, which is the case if and only if e li A l > 0. For the last part of the proposition, suppose that n 1 > n 2 . It follows that A 2 > A 1 , which implies that the transfer function of Group 2 penalizes e¤ort more than the transfer function of Group 1.
Proof of Proposition 4. a) It is necessary to show that the payo¤ function l ( l ; m ) is decreasing in l for all m , for l = 1; 2. This is the case if the derivative of l ( l ; m ) with respect to l is negative in the interval Making some computations, it follows that 2 = n l [1=n l + 1=n m ] n l [ l + m ]. Therefore l ( l ; m ) is decreasing in the interval l [0; 1], with a maximum at l = 0. Then, the dominant strategy of both groups is to set l = 0. Insert the equilibrium rules l in a l and b l for l = 1; 2 in the linear transfer functions to obtain the transfers.
For the second part of the proof, since l = 0, from equation (26) it can be deduced that E l = n l V =4 for l = 1; 2. It follows that p l = 1=2 and l = n l V =4.
b) Firstly, it is necessary to show that 1 ( 1 ; 2 ) is decreasing in 1 for all 2 . This is the case if the …rst derivative of 1 ( 1 ; 2 ) with respect to 1 is negative for all 2 . The derivative is negative if and only if 1=n 1 1=n 2 + 2 (n 2 1)=n 2 + 1 (n 1 1)=n 1 . The right hand side is minimal in our domain of is a maximum, it is su¢ cient to show that 2 ( 1 ; 2 ) is increasing (decreasing) in 2 for all 2 < (>) 2 .
The payo¤ function of Group 2 is increasing (decreasing) in 2 if and only if @ 2 =@ 2 is positive (negative). This is the case if and only if ( 2 (n 2 1)=n 2 + =n 2 + 1 (n 1 1)=n 1 + 1=n 1 ) 1 > (<)n 2 =2. Since we know from previous results that 1 = 0, isolating 2 we obtain from the previous inequality that this is the case if and only if 2 < (>) 2 . Thus, 2 = (n 1 n 2 )=((n 2 1)n 1 ) is the mixed rule chosen by the organizer of Group 2. Insert the equilibrium rules l in a l and b l for l = 1; 2 in the linear transfer functions to obtain the transfers.
For the second part, introducing 1 = 0 and 2 = (n 1 n 2 )=((n 2 1)n 1 ) in equation (25) and making some arrangements, it follows that E 2 =E 1 = n 2 =(2n 1 n 2 ), which is clearly lower than 1 since n 1 > n 2 .
Then, E 1 > E 2 and as a result p 1 > p 2 . Finally, introducing the equilibrium values of 1 and 2 in equation (26), it follows that the e¤ort exerted by Group 1 is E 1 = n 2 V (2n 1 n 2 )=4n 1 , while the e¤ort of Group 2 is E 2 = V (n 2 ) 2 =4n 1 .
Appendix B
In Section 4, we assume that each organizer sets a transfer that implements the e¤ort of a centralized contest under the assumption that the organizer in the other group does likewise. This appendix shows under which conditions this assumption is plausible.
For simplicity, assume linear costs and that p l (E l ; E m ) is a Tullock CSF. Suppose the following game.
Each organizer decides either to monitor (M ) or not (N ) her individuals. Let s = (s 1 ; s 2 ) denote a vector of strategies of organizers, and s l = fM; N g for l = 1; 2. In the case that both organizers monitor individuals, the centralized contest takes place. In case both organizers do not monitor individuals, the decentralized contest takes place. Otherwise, one group behaves as in a centralized contest and the other group as in a decentralized contest.
In Section 3 we analyze both a centralized and a decentralized contest. Recall that in a centralized contest the payo¤s of each organizer are:
In equilibrium, E c l = vn 2 l n m =(n l + n m ) 2 and c l = vn 3 l =(n l + n m ) 2 . Also recall that in a decentralized contest the payo¤s of each individual are:
In equilibrium, E d l = v=4 and d l = v(2n l 1)=4. Suppose group l behaves as in a centralized contest and group m as in a decentralized contest. Organizer in group l maximizes (48) and individuals in group m maximize (49). In equilibrium E cd l = vn 2 l =(n l + 1) 2 , E cd m = vn l =(n l + 1) 2 , cd l = vn 3 l =(n l + 1) 2 and cd m = v(n l n m + n m n l )=(n l + 1) 2 . The upper-script cd denotes the scenario in which group l behaves as in a centralized contest and group m as in a decentralized contest.
Let n 1 = an 2 , with a 2 [1; 1). First of all, we analyze the best response function r l (s m ) of each organizer.
The following payo¤ matrix summarizes the payo¤s of each group in the di¤erent scenarios:
First, we show that r 1 (M ) = M . This is the case if a 3 n 2 =(1 + a) 2 > an 2 2 + n 2 (a 1)=(1 + n 2 ) 2 for all a 2 [1; 1). Let g 1=M (a) = a 3 (1 + a) 2 (a(1 + n 2 ) 1)
Note that g 1=M (a) is increasing for all a 2 [1; 1) since:
See …rst that g 1=M (a) is positive for all a 2 [1; 1), which implies that r 1 (M ) = M . Take the limit of g 1=M (a) when a ! 1. It follows that g 1=M (a) tends to 1=4n 2 1=(1 + n 2 ) 2 , which is positive. Now, take the limit when a ! 1. It follows that g 1=M (a) tends to 1=(1 + n 2 ) 1=(1 + n 2 ) 2 , which is positive. Since g 1=M (a) is increasing for all a 2 [1; 1), it follows that g 1=M (a) is positive for all a 2 [1; 1).
We now show that r 1 (N ) = M . This is the case if a 3 n 3 2 =(1 + an 2 ) 2 > (2an 2 1)=4. Let g 1=N (a) = a 3 n 3
2
(1 + an 2 ) 2 (2an 2 1) 1 4 (52)
Note that g 1=N (a) is increasing for all a 2 [1; 1) since:
See …rst that g 1=N (a) is positive for all a 2 [1; 1), which implies that r 1 (N ) = M . Take the limit of g 1=N (a) when a ! 1. It follows that g 1=N (a) tends to n 3 2 =(1+n 2 ) 2 (2n 2 1) 1=4, which is positive. Now, take the limit when a ! 1. It follows that g 1=N (a) tends to 1=2, which is positive. Since g 1=N (a) is increasing for all a 2 [1; 1), it follows that g 1=N (a) is positive for all a 2 [1; 1).
As a result, the organizer in the larger group has the dominant strategy of monitoring her individuals.
Finally, it is only necessary to analyze r 2 (M ). Notice r 2 (M ) = M if n 2 =(1+a) 2 > (an 2 2 +n 2 (1 a))=(1+an 2 ) 2 . Let g 2=M (a) = (1 + an 2 ) 2 (1 + a) 2 (a(n 2 1) + 1) 1 (54)
Note that g 2 (a) is decreasing for all a 2 [1; 1) since: @g 2=M (a) @a = (n 1) a 2 n 2 (1 a) + 2na(1 2a) 3a + 1 (a + 1) 3 (a(n 1) + 1)
See …rst that for all a 2 [1; 1) , there exists an a such that g 2=M ( a) = 0. Take the limit of g 2=M (a)
when a ! 1. It follows that g 2=M (a) tends to (1 + n 2 ) 2 =4n 2 1, which is positive. Now, take the limit when a ! 1. It follows that g 2=M (a) tends to 1. Since g 2=M (a) is decreasing for all a 2 [1; 1), by the intermediate value theorem, there exists an a such that g 2=M ( a) = 0. Thus, for all a < a, g 2=M (a) is positive which implies that r 2 (M ) = M , while for a > a, g 2=M (a) is negative which implies r 2 (M ) = N .
We conclude that there exists an a 2 [1; 1) such that for a < a, the strategy pro…le s = (M; M ) is an equilibrium. In such a case, the assumption in Section 4 that both organizers implement the centralized e¤ort is plausible. Otherwise, the strategy pro…le s = (M; N ) is an equilibrium. Organizer in Group 2 prefers not to monitor her individuals because the larger probability of winning by exerting more e¤ort does not compensate the costs.
Appendix C
This appendix analyzes the implementation of centralized e¤ort setting when individuals have di¤erent valuations of the prize, and discusses the implications of this heterogeneity when organizers set transfers strategically at the end of the section. Assume that v li is the valuation that individual i in group l has for the public prize. Assume without loss of generality that v l1 > v l2 > ::: > v ln . Assume also that V l = P n l i=1 v li . We assume linear costs and the Tullock CSF for tractability.
We start the analysis by obtaining the e¤ort that groups exert in a centralized contest when individuals in a group have di¤erent valuations of the prize. The payo¤ function of each organizer is:
Then, each organizer chooses the amount of e¤ort that maximizes the group payo¤s given that she is competing with the other group. It follows that the optimal e¤ort of each group in a centralized contest where individuals value the prize di¤erently is:
The upper-script ch denotes the centralized scenario where players value the prize di¤erently. Therefore, the group whose sum of valuations is larger will exert more e¤ort in equilibrium and is more likely to win the contest. Now, we solve the decentralized contest with transfers with heterogeneous individuals. The payo¤ function of every individual is:
Every individual chooses the e¤ort that maximizes equation (58). The set of …rst order conditions are:
@e li v li = w li (e li ; E l i ) for m 6 = l, i = 1:::n l :
Denote w li (e li ; E l i ) (1 @t li (e li ; E l i )=@e li )=v li . Note that in the case there are not transfers, only individuals whose valuation is larger in each group will exert e¤ort. 17 In order to let the equilibrium be such that every individual in the contest exerts a positive amount of e¤ort, let us implement a transfer function that allows that the …rst order condition of every individual is binding. Then, the right hand side of the equation for every individual is the same value. Using the …rst order condition of every individual in both groups, we obtain the group e¤ort evaluated in equilibrium:
E th l = w mj (e th mj ; E th m j ) (w li (e th li ; E th l i ) + w mj (e th mj ; E th m j )) 2 for l = 1; 2.
(60)
The upper-script th denotes the decentralized contest with transfers scenario where players value the prize di¤erently. The organizer of each group implements the e¤ort of the centralized contest where individuals value the prize di¤erently choosing the transfer t l (e li ; E l i ) such that E ch l = E th l . The transfer function implementing the e¤ort in a centralized contest where individuals value the prize di¤erently is:
, for l = 1; 2; i = 1:::n l :
To check that this is the case, insert transfer (61) in (58) and check that the e¤ort of the decentralized contest with transfers coincide with the centralized contest. To construct the transfer function, equate (57) and (60) for both groups and solve the system of equations with unknowkns w li (e th li ; E th l i ) for l = 1; 2. We obtain that w li (e li ; E l i ) = 1 @t li (e li ;E l i ) @e li v li = 1 V l , for i = 1:::n l , l = 1; 2.
Isolate and integrate @t li (z li ; E l i )=@z li with respect to z li in the interval [0; e li ]. It follows that the transfer function of individual i in group l is given by:
t li (e li ; E l i ) = e li v li V l e li + Q(E l i ):
Since P n l i=1 t li (e li ; E l i ) = 0, it follows that:
e lj v lj V l e lj = (n l 1)Q(e lj ) + Q(0); j = 1:::n l .
which can be rewritten as:
Q(e lj ) = e lj n l 1
[ v lj V l 1]; j = 1:::n l . 
Introducing equation (44) for j and k and rearranging we obtain that:
Q(e lj + e lk ) = e lj n l 1
[
Repeating this process, we obtain that
And introducing it in equation (63) the transfer (61) arises.
Transfer (61) also implements the e¤ort of the centralized contest for a general Contest Success Function of the form p l (E l ; E m ), though a functional form allows easier procedures to obtain the shape of the transfer.
Individuals with lower valuations of the public prize have a more meritocratic transfer than individuals with higher valuations of the prize. By setting a more meritocratic transfer to individuals with lower valuations, these individuals are induced to exert the same amount of e¤ort that the individuals with a higher valuation. In particular, with these transfers every individual has the same marginal cost. It is worthy to note that although every individual in the group has the same marginal cost and since this problem is dealing with linear costs, the main importance falls in the aggregate of the e¤ort exerted in the group. By setting these transfers, the marginal cost of every individual is being substituted with its valuation relative the aggregate valuation of the group, solving the free riding and overworking problem.
In the symmetric equilibrium in which every individual in the group exerts the same amount of e¤ort, those individuals who have a higher valuation of the public prize will face higher costs. Then, although these transfers induce all individuals to exert e¤ort, they redistribute the cost in deterrence to those who value the public prize the most.
We end by discussing the implications of heterogeneity when organizers set transfers strategically. Given the similarities with Section 5, we omit the analysis. First, the problem becomes excessively complicated if we allow a di¤erent transfer function for every individual. Then, if we focus on the same transfer function, only top individuals exert e¤ort. The organizer of each group decides the transfer depending on the aggregate prize value of the group. In particular, an organizer has the dominant strategy of setting l = 0 (1) if V l is su¢ ciently large (small), independently on the rival group. This is because the organizer cares about the group payo¤s and …nds it convenient to set a meritocratic transfer function or not depending on this aggregate value. In case only one organizer has a dominant strategy, the rival group chooses a mixed rule l 2 [0; 1]. This is because the rival organizer maximizes her payo¤s subject to this dominant strategy. Finally, if none of the organizers have a dominant strategy (their aggregate prize value is neither su¢ ciently large nor small), there is no equilibrium in pure strategies.
